

Thomas Ricklin, « Filosofia non è altro che amistanza a sapienza »

Abstract: This is the opening speech of the SIEPM world Congress held in Freising in August 2012. It illustrates the general theme of the Congress – The Pleasure of Knowledge – by referring mainly to the Roman (Cicero, Seneca) and the medieval Latin and vernacular tradition (William of Conches, Robert Grosseteste, Albert the Great, Brunetto Latini), with a special emphasis on Dante's *Convivio*.

Nadja Germann, Logic as the Path to Happiness: Al-Fārābī and the Divisions of the Sciences

Abstract: Divisions of the sciences have been popular objects of study ever since antiquity. One reason for this esteem might be their potential to reveal in a succinct manner how scholars, schools or entire societies thought about the body of knowledge available at their time and its specific structure. However, what do classifications tell us about the *pleasures* of knowledge? Occasionally, quite a lot, particularly in a setting where the acquisition of knowledge is considered to be the only path leading to the pleasures of ultimate happiness. This is the case for al-Fārābī (d. 950), who is at the center of this paper. He is particularly interesting for a study such as this because he actually does believe that humanity's final goal consists in the attainment of happiness through the acquisition of knowledge; and he wrote several treatises, not only on the classification of the sciences as such, but also on the underlying epistemological reasons for this division. Thus he offers excellent insight into a 10th-century theory of *what* knowledge essentially is and *how* it may be acquired, a theory which underlies any further discussion on the topic throughout the classical period of Islamic thought.

David Luscombe, Otto of Freising and Historical Knowledge

Abstract: Otto of Freising (c. 1111-1158) was one of the most philosophical historians of the Middle Ages who reflected on the position of historical knowledge among the arts. His *History of the Two Cities* adjusts earlier models of universal history to show, in the light of his interpretation of Daniel's prophecy in the Old Testament (Daniel 2), how far the Roman Empire had declined, a tragedy that nonetheless carried within it signs of progress and divine interventions. His *Deeds* of Frederick Barbarossa further illustrate Otto's belief that history teaches philosophical lessons.

Irene Caiazzo, Nature et découverte de la nature au XII^e siècle : nouvelles perspectives

Abstract: Thanks to Chenu's and Gregory's studies, twelfth-century discovery of Nature is become a major topic in philosophical historiography. During the last four decades, many quality publications were devoted to Nature and philosophy of Nature in the twelfth century. Recent scholarship paid much attention to medicine, astrology, translators and translations, Aristotelian philosophy. Finally, the picture is very complex and rich. The article gives an overview of the different philosophical and scientific traditions and outlines some new directions for future research.

Luisa Valente, Happiness, Contemplative Life, and the *tria genera hominum* in Twelfth-Century Philosophy:
Peter Abelard and John of Salisbury

Abstract: As Christians, all twelfth-century Latin thinkers identified true happiness with the happiness God promises in the afterlife. This happiness was believed to be entirely spiritual, consisting in the endless vision of God. Nevertheless, along with this *beatitudo in patria* we also find in some twelfth-century authors the idea of a *beatitudo in via* as the philosophical life. This life can be characterized either as completely contemplative and solitary, or as one that remains partially attached to material circumstances and (political) action in society. Within this broad framework, this paper emphasizes three points:

- a. the ascetic and almost purely contemplative character of the ideal of the philosophical life as we find it in twelfth-century authors like Peter Abelard and John of Salisbury;
- b. the role played by philosophers in some twelfth-century triads of human types;
- c. the fact that, in spite of the monastic touch which often color them, many theses held by twelfth-century defenders of the philosophical life are common to those later university masters who were once called 'Averroists' or 'radical Aristotelians'.

The first section of this article provides an outline of the substantial discussion about true happiness as beatific vision as is found in Peter Abelard's *Collationes* or *Dialogus inter philosophum, iudaeum et christianum*. The following sections present some twelfth-century triads of *genera hominum*, in which the ideal of the philosophical life plays a significant role. These triads are extracted from the following texts: *Moralium dogma philosophorum*, William of Conches's *Glosae super Macrobius*, the *Florilegium morale oxoniense*, John of Salisbury's *Policraticus*, Bernard of Clairvaux's *De consideratione*, Hugues of Saint Victor's *De sacramentis*.

Manuel Lázaro Pulido, ¡*Sapere gaude!* La fuente bonaventuriana de la literatura mística del saber

Abstract: One of the fundamental literature traditions that reflect the emotions of knowledge to be found in mystical literature of Iberian Peninsula. This paper analyses the role of '*gaudium*' in the work of Fr. Juan de los Ángeles O.F.M. first considering the work of Fr. Luis de Granada. Second reflecting the philosophical construction of the mystical theology of Franciscan master: dialogue between scholastic (Thomas Aquinas) and mystical theology, specially the bonaventurien imprint in *gaudium sapere* as philosophy of love. The historiographical category of Poetic Tradition (J.E. Gracia) could be useful as a basis of this reflexion.

Catherine König-Pralong, *Omnes homines natura scire desiderant*. Anthropologie philosophique et distinction sociale

Abstract: This paper reconstructs some important medieval interpretations of the first two words of the Aristotelian Metaphysics: "*Omnes homines natura scire desiderant*". After presenting lay readings of the 14th-15th centuries, it returns to earlier scholastic and

clerical interpretations of the Aristotelian “natural” desire for knowledge. Medieval readers of Aristotle coming from various backgrounds noted the strong discrepancy between the Aristotelian definition of man and the discriminatory social reality of their time. They elaborated different strategies of reading that allowed them to downplay or emphasize, to legitimize or challenge, the monopolization of knowledge by a clerical elite.

Roberto Hofmeister Pich, *Infinite Creator*

Abstract: The concept of “infinite being” (*ens infinitum*) is a key concept in John Duns Scotus’s metaphysics. Scotus believes that we are able indeed of having a sound concept of infinite being that can be properly used in metaphysics to conceive God, insofar as we assume that we have no proper or perfect concept of the divine essence. At the same time, the logic of the concept and the formal way how it should be construed in order to be a sufficient concept for conceiving the divine essence was never fully presented by Scotus either in one single or even in several clearly connected texts. In this study, we explore a central thesis explicitly stated by Scotus for the construing of the concept, namely that “we understand the infinite through the finite”.

Alessandra Beccarisi, *Ex Germano in rebus divinis*. „Spekulative“ und „deutsche“ Mystik im Kontext

Abstract: In this paper, I offer an analysis of a passage from Eckhart’s commentary on the verse of the Genesis *In principio creavit caelum et terram* that has not received, in my opinion, sufficient attention so far. In this passage (*In Gen.* I n. 3, LW I/1, 186.13-187.10), Eckhart points out that the *principium* through which God created the world is the ideal model, i.e. the *ratio essendi* of a thing as well as its *ratio cognoscendi*. It is also the cause of the essence of the thing (*quidditas rei sensibilis*) and, as Aristotle says, of its definition and its scientific proof (*demonstratio*). Eckhart also quotes Averroes, according to whom philosophers have always searched for the quiddity of a sensible thing because it could lead to knowledge of the first cause of being. By this, Eckhart warns, Averroes does not mean God, as some erroneously think (*plerique errantes*), but the *ratio idealis* of sensible things, which is expressed by their definition. Joseph Koch’s critical edition does not identify who the *plerique errantes* that Eckhart speaks of could be. The discovery of their identity gives us the opportunity to reconsider the different opinions of Albert the Great, Ulrich of Strasburg, Dietrich of Freiberg and Meister Eckhart in relation to the role played by the concept of *quidditas* in their works, and therefore revisit the old question of German speculative mysticism.

Sergei Mariev, Theoretical *eudaimonia* in Michael of Ephesus

Abstract: The present paper concentrates on the comments of Michael of Ephesus to the 10th book of the Nicomachean Ethics. In particular it investigates the way in which Michael of Ephesus conceived the relationship between political and theoretical happiness. Doing so allows to evidence the theoretical ties that connect Michael of Ephesus with the Peripatetic philosopher Aspasius and demonstrates the influence of Proclus on Michael of Ephesus.

Stamatios Gerogiorgakis, Taking Pleasure in Knowing according to the Greek Commentaries of the *Nicomachean Ethics* after the 11th Century

Abstract: After a short presentation of Aristotle’s views on morally acceptable pleasures vis-à-vis the hedonist and the Platonic views, the Byzantine commentaries published in CAG 19.2 and 20 on knowledge as pleasure are discussed. It is shown that the Byzantine commentators are eventually keen in discovering problems in the Aristotelian account, in a way reminiscent of their Christian premises and akin to Platonism.

Tengiz Iremadze, Die erkennende Seele des Menschen und ihre Funktion im *Proklos-Kommentar* von Joane Petrizi

Abstract: Joane Petrizi (12th century) – the most significant Georgian medieval philosopher – devoted intensive work to Neoplatonic philosophy. Particularly important is his Georgian translation of Proclus’ *Elementatio theologica*, on which he commented extensively. One of the most important problems of Joane Petrizi’s *Commentaries* is that of the cognizing soul, which is to be presented in relation to the man’s cognitive faculty. In his *Commentaries*, Petrizi speaks mainly of the soul in general and of its different types *in nuce*, nevertheless to explain some important aspects of the Neoplatonic gnoseology by means of Petrizi’s concept of “man’s soul”, proves to be a fruitful effort. In his *Commentaries* Joane Petrizi frequently makes use of the terms the “soul of man” and “man’s soul”. A clear definition of “man’s soul”, as one of the most important types of souls, can be attained through a unified analysis of passages on the “particular soul”, which are scattered in *Commentaries*.

George Arabatzis, Daniel Furlanus on Michael of Ephesus and the Pleasure of Biological Knowledge

Abstract: The paper examines Daniel Furlanus’ critique of Michael of Ephesus’ commentary on Aristotle’s *Parts of Animals* I. Furlanus was a Greco-Venetian of the 16th Century from Crete who studied in Padua and wrote in Latin a commentary on *PA* I. His main critical position is that the Byzantine commentator of the 11th/12th Centuries Michael of Ephesus is making a Platonic interpretation of the Aristotelian text. On the question of the relation between biological science and pleasure, the two commentators give radically different answers. Pleasure for Michael of Ephesus is not worth of philosophical consideration except as a possible hindrance to scientific knowledge; for Furlanus, the pleasure of biological science is quite similar to the pleasure provided by the works of art. Consequently, the two authors have a diverging opinion as to the status of the cognizing individual’s position as to pleasure.

Mokdad Arfa Mensia, La connaissance vraie comme cause possible de souffrance perpétuelle chez al-Fārābī

Abstract: We examine Fārābī's ideas through a set of formal heresiography, since there is parallel between his claims and the classification of Islamic sects. In him, there is a kind of heresiography of the cities (or religions) based on philosophical criteria: the leader, the inhabitants, the religion (with its two folds: opinions and actions) and individual or collective destiny. Obviously, he substitutes philosophical criteria for Islamic heresiographical ones: true or wrong opinions and good or bad actions. These criteria determine the human destiny: eternal happiness for the one who has true opinions and virtuous actions, eternal suffering for the one who has true opinions but bad actions, and nothingness for the one who has false opinions and bad actions.

Hence, we can conclude that:

– The combination of the components of the city gives only these three possible destinies.

– The theoretical dimension (ideas on beings), be it philosophical (truths) or religious (symbols), is the real cause of survival after death. This is why the destiny of the vicious man (*fāsiq*, true opinions and bad actions) is eternal suffering, and why the destiny of the one who has erroneous ideas (*dāll*) becomes extinct. It is by means of true ideas that the human soul becomes a lasting entity, and neither by means of false ideas nor actions, in spite of the decisive role of the practical dimension.

– It seems that, outside the virtuous city, there are no opinions but those of the misguided city and there are no actions but those of the ignorant. This latter, which is different from the altered (*mubaddila*), the vicious and the misguided (*dālla*), has a distribution which depends on the one selected out of the many illusory good of the ignorant city.

The formal heresiography, devoid of its religious, even coranic content, and refilled by philosophical determinations may prove useful in correcting some ancient and more recent unreliable interpretations of al-Fārābī's texts.

Miklós Maróth, Delight of Knowledge in al-Māwardī's View

Abstract: Speaking of "delight of knowledge" al-Māwardī explains the meaning of knowledge (*ilm*) in a sense which is alien to the philosophical tradition, but well known in the ancient Greek rhetoric. Some signs indicate that the Arabic *adab*-literature is in a certain respect heir to the Greek rhetoric. The presence of some elements of philosophy in al-Māwardī's writings can be explained by the fact that the traditional rhetoric formation relied on a basic knowledge of philosophy too. This kind of the popular version of philosophy has been conveyed to al-Māwardī, and through him to the Arab readers. One has to take into account the ancient rhetoric and the *adab*-literature as an alternative channels through which Greek philosophy has been transmitted to the Islam.

Francisco O'Reilly, La metafísica como perfección del deseo humano. Comentario a *Philosophia Prima* (IX, 7) del *Avicenna Latinus*

Abstract: After having developed his theory of being, the causes and theology, Avicenna studies in chapter 7 of book IX of *Philosophia prima* the end of human beings. In this paper I analyze Avicenna's considerations from a metaphysical perspective, and the importance that metaphysics has in the education of human desire. This education must be developed on metaphysical grounds because human being's most proper desire does not match that of our sensitive desires. This kind of desire is not immediate to our sensory experience, but is known through the arguments placed at the end of the Metaphysics. Thus, metaphysics as an essential feature of the education of human desire might allow us to distinguish different kinds of men. This attitude leads to the classification between ordinary souls and holy souls, i.e. those which enjoy the pleasure of knowledge and those which not.

Yassine Amari, Analysis of Pleasure in Ibn Sīnā

Abstract: The focus of our research has been the definitions of pleasure in Ibn Sīnā's philosophy. For that purpose we worked on identifying the principles upon which this issue has been built. In this context we made a comparison between intellectual pleasure and sensual pleasure. We came to the conclusion that the former is better than the latter. This in turn helped us make the distinction between the pleasure that occurs to us before the soul's separation from the body and the other which is after the separation. Hence we were able to recognize that man cannot obtain real happiness in this world, tarnished with vice, or only a little. That little happiness is absolutely incomparable with real happiness which occurs only after the separation of the soul from the body.

Olga Lizzini, Avicenna: the Pleasure of Knowledge and the Quietude of the Soul

Abstract: In his *Metaphysics of the Healing* (IX, 7), Avicenna presents his ideas about the destiny of the human soul in the afterlife. Considered philosophically, the afterlife is intellectual (bodily afterlife is explained by religious law). The human soul achieves perfection by becoming an *intellectual world* in which the whole of reality may be reflected. Analysing the meaning of this statement helps to elucidate not only how Avicenna conceives intellectual pleasure in the afterlife, but also how he characterizes the very process of knowledge. Intertwined therewith are at least two important subjects, richly illuminated by recent medieval historiographical research: 'intellectual' or 'mental felicity' and knowledge as conjunction with the agent intellect.

Terence J. Kleven, Ibn Bāḡḡa's Commentaries on al-Fārābī's *Letter* and *The Five Aphorisms*

Abstract: The purpose of this study is to provide evidence that Ibn Bāḡḡa's commentaries on al-Fārābī's logical writings reveal a perpetuation of al-Fārābī's logic in Andalusia and that they also assist us in the recognition of the nature and achievement of this logic. Ibn Bāḡḡa's *Introduction* or *Eisagoge* is a commentary on al-Fārābī's introductory *Letter* (*Risāla*) and the *Five Aphorisms* (*Khamsa Fuṣūl*), as well as subsequent logical treatises of al-Fārābī. Ibn Bāḡḡa, in agreement with al-Fārābī, presents logic as consisting of five *sylogistic arts*, *rhetoric*, *poetry*, *dialectic*, *sophistry* and *demonstration*. These arts are constituted by both the *form* and *matter* of logic, the matter referring to the five sylogistic arts in which the form of logic is employed. Ibn Ḥaldūn later testifies to this comprehensive account of the five sylogistic arts articulated primarily by al-Fārābī but also in some measure by Ibn Sīnā, and says that, by his time, this account

of the syllogistic arts had been replaced by a more limited account of logic. Ibn Ḥaldūn explains that this revised logic separates the form of logic from its matter, discards the matter of logic, and destroys the pillars of logic. This revised notion of logic, Ibn Ḥaldūn says, is in conformity with the methods of *kalām* and he observes in this version that “the books and methods of the ancients [Aristotle and his commentators] are avoided, as if they had never been, although they are full of the results and useful aspects of logic, as we have stated”. Ibn Bāḡḡa’s commentaries attest to a continuation of the older, more comprehensive, and more Aristotelian account articulated by al-Fārābī, and Ibn Bāḡḡa provides key insights into the recovery of the nature and excellence of al-Fārābī’s logic.

Francesca Forte, Averroes’s Aesthetics. The Pleasure of Philosophy and the Pleasure of Poetry

Abstract: The theme of the pleasure of knowledge is central in Averroes’ aesthetical reflection of Aristotle’s *Poetics*, regardless whether we side with the logical or with the moral interpretation. The first one stresses the continuity between Averroes and previous commentators in his attempt to reconstruct the *Poetics* as an integral part of the *Logic* itself, whereby poetic discourse is conceived as a form of reasoning based on syllogisms. According to the latter perspective, however, pleasure is central in that poetry is a tool towards the pursuit of happiness: in this perspective it is necessary to bear in mind some common themes present in other works by Averroes (particularly in the commentaries on the Aristotelian *Organon* – and especially the commentary on the *Rhetoric* –, in the commentaries on Plato’s *Republic*, and, last but not least, in the *Decisive Treatise*). The pleasure of contemplative knowledge must go hand in hand with the pursuit of communal happiness and therefore with the good and proper order of community and society. Poetry represents a central tool towards this aim in that it expresses moral truths which cannot not be communicated (to everybody) by means of logic and philosophy alone.

Edward C. Halper, Maimonides on the Scope of Divine and Human Self-Knowledge

Abstract: Maimonides’ claim, in *Guide of the Perplexed* I.68, that our intellect, like God’s, becomes one with the object it knows would seem to be at odds with his injunction to his readers to set their “thought to work on the first intelligible” and to “rejoice in what [it] apprehends” (III.51). The former passage supposes that we grasp individual essences by themselves, whereas the latter supposes that such essences are known only through their first cause. Since we cannot grasp the first cause, God, we cannot, apparently, grasp anything else or rejoice in it. After briefly sketching the solutions of Aristotle and Avicenna, this paper argues that Maimonides resolves these issues by distinguishing the metaphysical grasp of a single essence from the grasp of its relations – due to God’s will – with other essences and, more specifically, the metaphysical grasp of our own human essence from the grasp of ourselves through our physical and moral relations with the world. Insofar as we know ourselves by knowing everything else, our self-knowledge resembles God’s and, thereby, imitates the perfect actuality and complete pleasure of divine self-knowledge.

Yehuda Halper, Abraham Bibago on Intellectual Conjunction and Human Happiness. Faith and Metaphysics according to a 15th Century Jewish Averroist

Abstract: The 15th century Jewish Aragonian thinker, Abraham Bibago treats conjunction in his two main works, *Derekh Emunah* (“The Way of Faith”) and *Commentary* on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. In the former, which explicitly interprets Biblical and Talmudic stories along philosophical lines, Bibago promotes a neo-Platonic intellectual emanation schema and boldly asserts that human happiness is attained through conjunction with higher intellects. In the *Commentary*, which primarily treats Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* and Averroes’ commentaries on it, Bibago gives an account of conjunction that does not necessarily fit with the intellectual conjunction of *Derekh Emunah*. Indeed, his remarks in the *Commentary* are much less decisive about human happiness, suggesting that Bibago qua philosopher is more open minded about the summum bonum than he is qua religious thinker.

Taki Suto, From Analysis of Words to Metaphysical Appreciation of the World: the Platonism of Boethius

Abstract: Anicius Manlius Seuerinus Boethius has been regarded one of the major sources of Platonism in the Middle Ages, and the influence of different Platonists on his thought has been widely discussed. In his Aristotelian commentaries, however, Boethius rejects Platonists’ opinions while saying that Aristotle and Plato essentially agree. Boethius may have intended to show the agreement he saw, but did not provide any explanation in his works. In this article, I consider how Boethius could have seen such an agreement. While reexamining past remarks about Platonism in Boethius, I conclude that he adopts Porphyry’s view that Aristotelian logic functions as a step toward the metaphysical appreciation of the universe, which Platonists consider to be the most essential form of philosophy. However, Boethius follows Iamblichus in holding that the highest level of metaphysical appreciation involves mathematization.

Renato de Filippis, Die Freude (an) der Rhetorik in Anselm von Besates *Rhetorimachia*

Abstract: The *Rhetorimachia* by Anselm of Besate is one of the most original and less understood works of the high Middle Ages. By showing his literary and philosophical competences with this fictitious ‘rhetoric battle’ against his cousin, Anselm tries to obtain a prestigious job at Emperor Henry III’s court. In a continuous, polished game with his learned readers, Anselm uses all resources of the *trivium*, presenting his culture in a new, secular way, which is an anticipation of the Italian cultural context of the 12th century, the era of the Comuni.

Thomas Hanke, Lust an der *rectitudo*. Erkenntnis, praktische Vernunft und Emotionen bei Anselm von Canterbury

Abstract: This article provides an Anselmian interpretation of the theme of the congress, *Pleasures of Knowledge*. First, it shows the practical character of Anselm’s epistemology, according to his dialogue *De veritate*: cognition is conceived as a process characterised by an internal normative claim – called *rectitudo* – on the one hand, and practical acts supposed to meet this claim on the other hand.

Secondly, the same structure is analysed in Anselm's ethics especially in his soteriological work *Cur deus homo*, which serves as a link to connect the emotional mood of the *Orationes sive Meditationes* with the former considerations on epistemology. Thus, it is shown that emotions play a significant systematic role in Anselmian thought.

Chung-Mi HwangBo, Zur Teilhabe der Empfindung der Seele an der Gotteserkenntnis in Anselms *Monologion* und *Proslogion*

Abstract: In this paper, I attempt to demonstrate the role emotions play in the reflexive process of the rational knowledge of God in Anselm's *Monologion* and *Proslogion*. Special attention has been paid to the *Proslogion*, containing the renowned "unum argumentum", which itself was commonly understood as a special form of Anselm's methodology of the "sola ratione" for the knowledge of God. It could be seen as a significant argument against the emotions as affective expression of the soul, disqualifying the relevance of the "affectus". Introduced in the *Monologion*, the emotion is there a basic concept in the argument for the knowledge of God, and it assumes its full shape in the *Proslogion*. The aim of my contribution is to give an insight in the cognitive attitude, in respect to "affectus" as a "leading power" of the soul, as it unites with "ratio" and "fides" for the knowledge of God as a whole in the *Proslogion*.

Guy Hamelin, Volonté et *habitus* chez Pierre Abélard: un double héritage

Abstract: Abelard closely follows the Augustinian view with regard to the notion of intention. However, he distances himself from him concerning the contribution of acts in the evaluation of moral responsibility. Independent thinker, the philosopher of the twelfth century, then, uses an ancient Stoic thesis according to which all actions are indifferent, except those related to virtue and vice. He also takes back another idea of the Stoa concerning, this time, the concept of will as *habitus*. In this paper, we first expound Abelard's position on these issues before presenting the main sources to which he has access directly.

Giacinta Spinosa, Plaisir de la connaissance comme émotion intellectuelle chez Hugues de Saint-Victor

Abstract: In Hugh of St Victor the pleasure of knowledge is seen as an 'intellectual emotion', in that it exists at the intersection between affectivity and rationality. This is clear from various texts: from the *De fructibus carnis et spiritus* to the *De quinque septenis* and the *Sententiae de divinitate*, *gaudium* is seen as the intellectual emotion *par excellence*, as it is an 'inner' joy, a *jucunditas spiritualis* that produces happiness. From an anthropological point of view, joy and pleasure combine with knowledge to help men abandon the pleasures of the body and devote themselves to those of the spirit. This is linked to Hugh of St Victor's 'hedonistic' pedagogy, which holds that *docet quod scire delectet*, in that one learns more easily what is pleasant. Similarly, limited, restricted knowledge does not produce as much pleasure as extensive, wide-ranging knowledge. The essay sets these analyses in a table of Hugh's terminology that is organized in four semantic poles: 1) pleasure and desire (*delectatio, voluptas, oblectamentum, desiderium, libenter*); 2) joy (*jucunditas, laetitia, laetari, gaudium*); 3) happiness (*felicitas, beatitudo*); 4) love (*dilectio, dilectus* adj, *dilectus* subst).

Hideki Nakamura, *Spiritualium gaudiorum plenitudo* in der Erkenntnislehre Richards von St. Viktor

Abstract: The epistemology of Richard of Saint-Victor is characterised through a detailed analysis of *contemplatio*, the highest mode of human knowledge. *Contemplatio* culminates in an ecstasy, in which man reaches the highest object of his knowledge, God himself, and is fulfilled by true spiritual pleasure. This plenitude of spiritual pleasure is not just the fruit of knowledge, but fed by love. Richard distinguishes three paths of knowledge (*cogitatio – meditatio – contemplatio*) in accordance with the growth of the love between God and man. The love of God gives an orientation to human knowledge. Through the love of God human knowledge is structured from disoriented *cogitatio* to oriented *meditatio* as a spiritual ascent to the divine things supported by virtues, then finally to *contemplatio*, which culminates in ecstasy with true spiritual pleasure. So the essence of true spiritual pleasure reflects the structural key of the highest knowledge, *contemplatio*, namely the love of God.

Georgina Rabassó, *In caelesti gaudio*. Hildegard of Bingen's Auditory Contemplation of the Universe

Abstract: Hildegard of Bingen's mystical and cognitive experience uniquely combines the visual and auditory dimensions of the knowledge, in her own account, revealed to her by divine wisdom. According to Hildegard, the hidden meaning of her visions was communicated to her by a voice from the sky; thus the *auditio* allows her to understand the *uisio*, while the *uisio* allows her to remember the message of the *auditio*. Moreover, as we shall see, the Rhenish *magistra* apparently finds pleasure in the knowledge of the natural world, an intellectual pleasure about which she does not speak directly but which is clearly shown in her works. In this paper, on the basis of Hildegard's definition of *scientia*, I will try to determine what she understands by 'knowledge' and use her notion of *praescientia Dei* as a measure for the analysis of the distinct visions of the universe set out in two of her works, the *Sciuias* and the *Liber diuinorum operum*. There we can see that, despite the divine inspiration to which she attributes her words, her conception of the cosmos is essentially human.

Brigitte Saouma, L'ignorance des cathares d'après Izarn

Abstract: The debate between Izarn, a Dominican and inquisitor, and the Catharian repentant bishop Sicart de Figueiras raises the question of the so-called ignorance of the Catharians, especially in biblical studies. If the *Interrogatio Iohannis*, one of the Catharian sources and an apocryphal and gnostic gospel, appears during the debate, the exegetical tradition is also present in the myth of fallen angels. In one of his main accusations Izarn evokes the metempsychosis revealing the antiques doctrines influence on the Catharians. Therefore, the heretics expressed a large number of knowledge in the vernacular language receptive to the most humbles and the illiterates persons. This has been their strength face to the rational and scholarly theology acquired from books by the Catholic clergy.

Aafke M.I. van Oppenraay, Michael Scot's Translation of Aristotle's *Books on Animals* and the Pleasures of Knowledge

Abstract: Michael Scot's thirteenth-century Arabic-Latin translation of Aristotle's zoological works strongly influenced the medieval reception of these books. Whereas Scot's translation was mostly scientific, a growing public was offered the opportunity to experience the pleasures of this kind of knowledge in general.

Katrin Fischer, Avicenna's *ex-uno*-Principle in William of Auvergne's *De trinitate*

Abstract: William of Auvergne is one of the first Latin thinkers to discuss Avicenna's cosmological theory of emanation and with it the famous principle «*ex uno, secundum quod est unum, non est nisi unum*». He accepts the validity of this principle itself, but vehemently rejects its use in the field of cosmology to explain God's acting as the universe's creator. Within the context of Trinitarian theology, however, William applies the *ex-uno*-principle to explain two core issues concerning the emanation of the second Trinitarian person out of the first: the theory of the only-begotten Son and the persons' sharing of the one divine essence. In his treatment of the latter, William uses the Avicennian principle in a modified way which is illustrated in this paper.

Isabelle Moulin, Les deux sources du bonheur humain : contemplation intellectuelle et vision de Dieu.
Avicenne, Albert le Grand

Abstract: This contribution aims at putting forth two different receptions of the Aristotelian conception of the intellectual contemplation as the unique source of human happiness. As it is defined in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle understands intellectual contemplation as a philosophical activity, based on the same model as the divine activity of the prime mover. Following Aristotle, Avicenna defines beatitude in pure philosophical terms, thus excluding any religious requisite or divine intervention. Albert the Great appears to be extremely dependent from Aristotle's and Avicenna's influences but includes theological contemplation based on the *lux gloriae* for human beatitude. Beyond the historical interest, this paper hopes to provide an insight into the relationship between terrestrial happiness and celestial beatitude and to show how philosophy and theology interact to construe such a relation.

Eileen C. Sweeney, Roger Bacon and Albert the Great on Aristotle's Notion of Science

Abstract: The paper examines the different uses of and responses to Aristotle's account of science in the first wave of interpretation of Aristotle's theory of science and works in natural science and metaphysics in the early 13th century in Roger Bacon and Albert the Great. The author argues that Bacon reduces all the disciplines to mathematics as the most scientific discipline, even as he argues that *experimentum* is at the center of scientific evidence and conclusions. Albert the Great, by contrast, gives a more strongly analogical account of science, with broader differences between different disciplines as operating according to different intellectual 'lights' and methods. Albert champions *experimentum* in physics in a special way, rejecting a mathematical physics.

Henryk Anzulewicz, Albertus Magnus über die *felicitas contemplativa* als die Erfüllung eines natürlichen Strebens nach Wissen

Abstract: One of Albert the Great's dearest concerns throughout his career was the question of the good; the good which humans naturally desire and which culminates in ultimate happiness. In his earliest work, tellingly entitled *De natura boni*, Albert's interest principally concerns epistemological and practical questions: How can we know wherein the good consists? How can we acquire it? Under what circumstances may we lose it and what is necessary to reacquire it? In this initial context, Albert relies on the Augustinian conception that the desired good lies in the "Good of all goods" (*De trin.* VII.3) and that its attainment in this contingent world takes place almost exclusively through moral conduct. With the inception of appropriating Aristotle's complete *Nicomachean Ethics*, however, Albert's conception of the good undergoes a fundamental shift. Based on an intellectualist anthropology according to which the human being is "solely intellect", Albert advances the intellectual virtues as necessary condition for a specifically human, namely intellectualist, perfection. Albert maintains that ultimate happiness, which lies at the end of contemplation, constitutes an intellectual perfection as object of our natural desire that is attained with certainty. The purpose of this paper, then, is to expose and examine Albert's critical shift from a moral to an intellectualist conception of the good.

Maria Burger, Gotteserkenntnis im Aufstieg bei Albertus Magnus

Abstract: In his commentary of Dionysius the Areopagite's *Mystical Theology* Albert the Great outlines the allegorical exegesis of Moses' ascent of the mount as a way to the unknown God. Step by step Moses has to purify himself, to leave behind his natural knowledge. Separated from all human beings he alone proceeds to the cloud of unknown. At last the infusion of divine light lets him know God through negations. The normal, human way of knowing God is limited, so the mind should attain the paradox of knowing in unknowing. Albert claims that all we cannot properly predicate by names obtained from things known to us, is best indicated by negations. The peak described by Dionysius as union, Albert shows to be intellectual perfection. Guided by divine illumination man contemplates the Trinitarian God. Thus contemplation supports any theological investigation. Descending the mountain, as Albert says in his *Summa*, Moses spoke to the people. Likewise after contemplation the theologian has to illumine others about what he has learned about the cause of creation.

Graziano Perillo, La contemplazione, principale caratteristica dell'Evangelista Giovanni secondo Alberto Magno

Abstract: In the Prologue to the Commentary on St. John, Albert the Great uses the image of an eagle to describe the main feature of the Evangelist, that's the contemplation. As an eagle John flew into the sky of Trinity going beyond creatural limitation and living a experience, that can be interpreted like a *raptus*. For better understanding the contemplation of John, some texts are very important: *De resurrectione*; *Quaestio de visione dei in patria*; *Quaestio de raptu*, in which the german teacher explains in what sense the human intellect can know the divine infinity. About this problem it's significant the distinction between "quid est" and "ut est" in God. The article closes showing how John represents a model of a dominican friar in some texts of the Commentary.

Andrea Colli, From *sapientia honorabilissima* to *nobilitas animae*. A Note on the Concept of "Nobility" in Ulrich of Strasbourg's *De summo bono*

Abstract: In many respects, the adjective "noble" plays a significant role in Ulrich of Strasbourg's *De summo bono*. It defines contemplative happiness and philosophical wisdom, and delineates a remarkable character of the intellect (human and divine). In examining some significant occurrences of the term, I intend to focus my attention on its theoretical meaning and on the sources which have influenced its use. In this way, I will demonstrate that "nobility" is a necessary, key factor for investigating what the real pleasure of knowledge consists in for Ulrich.

Jörn Müller, Memory as an Internal Sense: Avicenna and the Reception of His Psychology by Thomas Aquinas

Abstract: Avicenna develops a highly original account of memory as one of the five internal senses. In this paper, I briefly reconstruct this conception and evaluate its influence on the faculty psychology which emerged in the Latin West from the 12th century onwards. Particular attention is paid to Thomas Aquinas's harsh criticism of Avicenna's denial of intellectual memory, which touches on several epistemological, anthropological and theological issues.

Gerald Cresta, Bonaventure: Intellectual Contemplation, Sapiential Contemplation and *beatitudo*

Abstract: Bonaventure distinguishes two modes of *beatitudo*: the objective, which he defines as the ultimate end of all rational operations; and the subjective, which he considers present in the soul by inherency. In its divine influence, the *beatitudo* directly updates the *mens*, that is the potency of the soul and not its substance. This understanding of the unity of order of the potencies in the soul, understood as the express likeness to God, incorporates the concept of *fruitio* in a spiritual activity that exceeds the dichotomy intelligence-will and is located well beyond the opposition between thomistic intellectualism and the voluntarism of Scotus, integrating them into a spiritualistic synthesis: the sapiential contemplation. This paper analyzes the deductive moments of the acts of the inner potencies of the soul as constituents of the created beatitude. The guideline are the transcendental concepts of being in consonance with the contemplative activity.

Tomáš Machula, *Per intellectum ad beatitudinem*. Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure on the Role of Prudence in Human Life

Abstract: This paper deals with the virtue of prudence in the thinking of Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure. It compares the two different approaches of Dominican and Franciscan High Medieval Scholasticism concerning the virtue of prudence, which is an intellectual virtue but one that is closely related to human acts and consequently to the final end of human life.

Alessandro Ghisalberti, Il compimento della felicità in Tommaso d'Aquino

Abstract: The main feature of happiness requires the desire to be fulfilled by the achievement of the desired good, and in this quietness the subject feels pleasure (*delectatio*). Then the highest experience of delight consists in the achievement of the last end, of the supreme good, able to satisfy the human desire completely. Hence two different kinds of happiness arise: the one is earthly happiness, which the body takes part to, consequent to the possession of finite goods; the other is eternal happiness, derived from the highest good. Thomas Aquinas states the same formal feature for both earthly and eternal happiness, namely their connection to the most proper human activity: knowing, contemplating, understanding (*comprehendere*) the good. For this reason Thomas argues for the strict connection between the pursuit of human happiness on earth and its final achievement, because the man, even as searching for earthly happiness, aspires to eternal beatitude.

Daniel De Haan, *Delectatio, gaudium, fruitio*. Three Kinds of Pleasure for Three Kinds of Knowledge in Thomas Aquinas

Abstract: This paper investigates Thomas Aquinas's threefold division of pleasure into *delectatio*, *gaudium*, and *fruitio*, and its taxonomical basis in his threefold division of knowledge into tactility, the cogitative power, and the intellect.

Pascale Bermon, Plaisir et coordination sensorielle des animaux chez Aristote et Thomas d'Aquin

Abstract: This article focuses on *Nicomachean Ethics* III, 13 (1118a18-b7) and its quotations in the work of Thomas Aquinas. The aristotelian examples of predators pursuing their prey inserted in this extract aroused Thomas' interest from the *Sentences* commentary

until the *II^a-II^{ae}*. They offered him an alternative model to the famous avicennian paradigm of the sheep fleeing the wolf, that enabled him to account for the motivation of animal movement, instinct and animal pleasure. Unlike modern commentators, Thomas takes seriously this small but significant piece of zoology inserted in the chapter on temperance of the *ethica vetus*.

Oleg E. Dushin, Morality as Knowledge in Ethical Theory of Thomas Aquinas

Abstract: The article discusses the importance of Aristotle's teaching in the history of medieval Western scholasticism. It is suggested that two main interpretations of his theory were formed in the philosophical thought of the thirteenth century: the first conception was proposed by the teachers at the Faculty of Arts in Paris University – Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia; the other was put forward by Thomas Aquinas. Both approaches acquired particular significance in medieval culture. Boethius demonstrated the social status of University Magisters, teachers of philosophy, whereas Thomas Aquinas used Aristotelian ideas in theological discourse. He explained the role of intelligence and logic in morality. It stimulated the development of new trends in Christian world view.

Carlos Arthur Ribeiro do Nascimento, Renversant la hiérarchie

Abstract: The notion of hierarchy is omnipresent in XIIIth century. It is present even when the term is not used, as it happens regarding the faculties of the human soul, where the sensible knowledge and the passions are considered as inferiors to the intelligence and the will. However, Thomas Aquinas to describe the utmost wisdom to which the humans may aspire, viz the wisdom gift of the Holy Spirit, uses the senses and, among these ones, touch and taste, the most material senses, as well as the passions, mainly love and pleasure. So, when he tries to speak about this wisdom he will characterize it as a vision or contemplation, act of the intellect, but founded upon a loving and pleasing union. This union is like a taste of the divine goodness and the touch of the soul by God. He, therefore, reverses the hierarchy of the faculties.

Andrey Ivanov, Thomas Aquinas in Reference to the Beauty. The Two Definitions

Abstract: In this article we examine the main fragments of Thomas Aquinas regarding beauty. Our approach allows us to acquire the repertoire of definitions of beauty that are found in his commentaries and thought. Thus our scope is reconstruct at the theory of beauty that is implicit in Thomas Aquinas.

Ercolo Erculei, The Soul's Misery in the Fire according to Thomas Aquinas and Siger of Brabant

Abstract: The issue concerning the misery of the soul in fire was one of the most frequently discussed topics during the 13th century and the early decades of the 14th, with authors including Albert the Great, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant, Theodoric of Freiberg, Giles of Rome, Matthew of Acquasparta and Dante dealing with this problem in varying degrees. The purpose of my paper is to attempt to identify the reasons underlying the importance of this topic in the writings of Siger, Thomas and Albert. Indeed, behind its theological-exegetical veneer, crucial themes such as the interpretation of Aristotle's psychology and, more generally, the compatibility between natural/peripatetic philosophy and Christian faith emerge as the underlying issues at stake.

Silvia Negri, *Veritatem humiliter investigare*. Sul ruolo dell'umiltà in Enrico di Gand

Abstract: Humility was perceived in the Christian Middle Ages as a fundamental moral and intellectual quality, opening the way for access to the divine. How this access occurred, and for what kind of people, was dependent on different theological and philosophical presuppositions. The role of humility was thus moulded according to different anthropological and noetical models. By the end of the 13th century, the «question de l'humilité», as Alain de Libera posed it, had also become a locus for confrontation and definition between different intellectual identities. This study focuses on the role that the secular master Henry of Ghent (ca. 1217-1293) assigned to humility for approaching and transmitting divine truth, both from the perspective of the single individual and of the Christian community. Some topical categories describing essential features of humility – low/high, the ladder, interior/exterior, empty/full – aid in the analysis of some passages from the works of this theologian.

Giulia Sossi, *Il De laudibus divinae sapientiae* di Egidio Romano e la possibilità per l'uomo di conoscere Dio

Abstract: In the book *De laudibus divinae sapientiae*, according to Gilles, two opposite motors are at work in the human soul, sense and reason: the first one leads the man to evil; the second one to good. However Gilles gets the Thomist argument back to warn the reader that man, to reach the knowledge of the eternal truth and his own salvation, needs a third motor (the divine one), which compensates for the limits of human reason.

Therefore the human reason arranges the soul lower powers, while it itself is governed by the Holy Spirits gifts, that form its supernatural *habitus*. These gifts lead the soul, through an anagogic, gnosiological and moral process, to a gradual conversion to the divine supreme Wisdom.

The book under consideration reveals so some important changes in Gilles' doctrine. We'll analyze the problem of the human possibility to know and love God, according to Gilles' theses before and with the Scholastic debates.

Delphine Carron-Faivre, La République romaine comme modèle de la *felicitas civilis* chez Ptolémée de Lucques (v. 1240-1327)

Abstract: The Italian Dominican Ptolemy of Lucca (ca. 1240-1327) figures among the most significant political theoreticians of the Middle Ages. In his *De regimine principum* (ca. 1300), a continuation of Thomas Aquinas' *De regno*, Ptolemy paints a highly original

picture of civil happiness. Taking the Roman Republic as his model, Ptolemy praises the “political” government that is presented as a sufficient condition for *felicitas civilis*, and this through the virtue of its citizens, the balance of its forces, and the harmonious and active collaboration of the various groups that constitute the community.

Hans Kraml, *Cognitio substantiarum separatarum: Genitivus subiectivus oder Genitivus obiectivus?*

Abstract: According to Scotus, the philosophers hold – with Aristotle – that the ultimate goal of human life, and that which makes it perfect, consists in the knowledge of the separate substances. But neither this assumption, nor the theoretical knowledge accessible to human reason alone, is enough to ensure that human beings can achieve this goal. This goal can only be achieved if God reveals himself by means of traditions in the context of a community. Although Scotus does not deny that philosophers can recognize their ultimate goal by use of reason, he insists also on concrete and contingent conditions that can be understood as a revelation of God who otherwise would be unaccessible. This adds an important feature of contingency to the rational achievements of which human beings are capable.

Maria Manuela Brito-Martins, *La béatitude et le désir chez Duns Scot: beatitudo est frui summo bono*

Abstract: In this paper we examine the idea of *beatitudo* in Duns Scotus. We begin with the *Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum*, where the *Doctor Subtilis* presents a conception of the act of intellectual knowledge through the natural meaning of beatitude. Taking up the famous *incipit* of the *Metaphysics*, Duns Scotus develops the idea of a *maximum desiderium* and a *maxima scientia* as a way of human and natural perfection. In conceiving this *desiderium naturale* as form of ultimate realization, he sees it as similar to the knowledge of immaterial substances *in statu viae*. His definition of *beatitudo* also disagrees with the Thomist doctrine, developing it *a priori* as a *cognitio intuitiva*, making it possible for humans to achieve happiness *in statu viae*. In contrast, in *Ordinatio IV*, dist. 49, Scotus emphasizes the value of *beatitudo* in its ethical and theological sense, taking recourse to the Augustinian and Boethian definitions in order to understand its nature as the full expression of the intellectual, volitional and operational act, produced by the *actus fruitionis* and the *summum bonum*.

Thomas Marschler, *Frui essentia non fruendo persona. Die Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus über die Trennbarkeit von Wesenheit und Personen in der Gottesschau und ihre Kritik bei Wilhelm von Ockham*

Abstract: The paper argues that the doctrine of John Duns Scot concerning the possibility that one can enjoy the divine essence apart from the persons in the beatific vision, is a consequent application of important metaphysical principles on trinitarian theology. This judgment can be confirmed by taking into account William of Ockham’s rejection of the scotistic view.

Francesco Fiorentino, *The Desire for Knowledge in Early Scotist Debate: William of Alnwick and John of Reading*

Abstract: Alnwick distances himself from Scotus, as he appears in *Lectura Oxoniensis* and the commentary on *Metaphysics*, though the natural propensity of the will is affirmed in q. 9 d. 49 of Book Four of *Reportata Parisiensia*. However, this question could be spurious, or else more susceptible to the Parisian influence of teaching of Henry of Ghent, with whom Alnwick aligns himself when he sanctions without any doubt the fact that man desires to pass from a lesser good, guaranteed by philosophical speculation of an Aristotelian-Averroist matrix, to a supreme good, which coincides with the clear vision of divine essence, because man knows that essence both *naturaliter* and *supernaturaliter*. Alnwick tenaciously debates natural knowledge in the prologue to the *Commentary on the Sentences*, thanks to the use of *discursus*, which serves to set up a chain of syllogistic deductions in order to arrive at quidditative concepts of divinity in both an affirmative and negative sense. These concepts assure the wayfarer a general knowledge of God, which can be deepened with the abstracting faculty of the imagination *ex creaturis quia* in terms of eminence. The result is a knowledge which is specific, abstract and confused, which exalts God’s immanence as the apex of a scale of values and finds its roots in creatures. For this knowledge to become intuitive and distinct, the presence of divine essence is required, which is realised in a supernatural way in the beatific state. Nevertheless, this essence – as Alnwick observes in spite of Scotus – isn’t the efficient cause, but the *terminus* of beatific vision. Instead, the divine will causes the form of this vision in the blessed’s intellect, changing the latter’s status, as the recipient, and not the object, which is divine essence.

Alnwick’s arguments against Averroes’ theory were copied by Reading, who contests the very possibility of natural desire. For Reading, awareness of the imperfection of one kind of knowledge doesn’t provoke the natural desire to attain a more perfect knowledge, if this is considered impossible. The insufficiency of a confused knowledge of God in wholly satisfying man’s natural desire doesn’t imply the existence of something sufficient for this purpose.

John T. Slotemaker, Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham on Divine Simplicity and Trinitarian Relations

Abstract: The present paper examines the trinitarian theology of Adam Wodeham and Walter Chatton through an examination of the *filioque*, i.e., the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and Son. The paper argues that the strong emphasis on divine simplicity that emerged in the early fourteenth century had a subtle influence on how Wodeham and Chatton understood the intra-trinitarian distinctions between the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

Vesa Hirvonen, *William Ockham on the Psychology of Christ*

Abstract: William Ockham joins the general view that in its natural capacities, the intellectual soul of Christ is nobler than any other human being’s soul, but he does not think that Christ is omniscient or omnipotent in his human nature. Despite this, Ockham genuinely believes that Christ did not sin during his earthly life. He did not have any intrinsically sinful acts which are acts of the will, nor even

acts that can be extrinsically sinful, such as acts of the sensory appetite like the desire to fornicate. Furthermore, Christ did not have the tinder of sin which inclines ordinary human beings to commit sinful acts. Christ had, instead, a kind of inner rebellion against reason and will. His sensory acts, such as feeling hungry, thirsty, and tired were not always in accordance with his reason and will. As *viator*, Christ had the greatest possible amount of delight. Since God miraculously prevented the sadness-excluding effect of beatitude and delight in his soul, there was at the same time sadness in him. In heaven, the sadness in Christ is now absent. In Ockham's writings, the psychology of Christ also applies to Christ's presence in the Eucharist. Ockham considers that Christ being present in the Eucharist can have all the same actions and passions as when existing circumscriptively in a place.

Rodrigo Guerizoli, *Pleasure and Knowledge in John Buridan's Solution to the Debate over the Extension of the Aristotelian Supreme Good*

Abstract: There is an important controversy regarding how Aristotle comprehends the highest good. On one hand, in the first books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle seems to designate with the noun "eudaimonia" a second order end. On the other hand though, in the last book of the same work, he seems to restrict the meaning of eudaimonia to a single first-order end, namely theoretical contemplation. The so-called inclusive vs. dominant debate over Aristotle's eudaimonia was not overlooked in commentaries written during the Later Middle Ages, and one relevant discussion on the issue was recorded in John Buridan's *Questions on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*. This is the text I discuss in my paper, with the intention of reconstructing Buridan's attitude towards the inclusive vs. dominant debate. Specifically, I focus on the last book of the work, and I explore some key theses which guide Buridan's position on the issue, i.e. (i) that happiness may be understood either in the way of composition or in the way of resolution, (ii) that happiness is to be regarded as an appellative or connotative term, and (iii) that the happiness of the a whole human being should be distinguished from the happiness of his parts. Through reconstructing the connections among these theses I aim to present and to evaluate Buridan's view on that debate.

Amos Corbini, *Fruitio et beatitudo* entre volonté et intellect selon Pierre de Ceffons

Abstract: In the sixteenth question of his commentary to the *Sentences* (1348-49), the Cistercian Peter of Ceffons shows sometimes an hesitating attitude towards the problems related to *fruitio* and *beatitudo*, sometimes instead a greater firmness, especially when other Parisian theologians of his time displayed a good degree of agreement. In doing so, he quotes explicitly English authors of the years 1320-30, but also precedings *auctoritates* like Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, and typical themes of discussion of the Oxford *calculatores*; moreover, only sometimes he agrees with his confrère John of Mirecourt.

Cal Ledsham, *Pleasure in Philosophy and the Pretext of Theology*

Abstract: This paper considers the hermeneutic position, recently gaining some traction in the secondary literature (e.g. Pasnau), that Scholastics in the years 1330-1350 were not primarily interested in theology. Rather, their increasing engagement with "English subtleties" – a set of "logico-mathematical" techniques we now associate with scientific inquiry – was driven by their new, distinctively secular, natural-philosophy interests. In this, they become proto-moderns and philosophers in our contemporary sense. Consideration is given to whether this "pretext" reading of the Scholastics is coherent and plausible, and whether the logico-mathematical techniques were the province of natural philosophy at the time, or actually instead discipline-neutral, being employable in both theology and natural theology. The paper then assesses the rather meagre evidence offered for this reading (from the case of Peter Ceffons) and its unfortunate historiographical implications. It ends by advocating an existing and far more promising alternative hermeneutic for the Scholastics engaged in English subtleties, reading them in context as theologians pursuing theological knowledge rather than as philosophers. The Scholastics were not pursuing the pleasures of natural philosophy in their *Sentences* commentaries, but the beatitude of theology.

Ueli Zahnd, *Utilitas* als anti-spekulatives Motiv. Zur Rezeption eines Gerson'schen Anliegen im ausgehenden Mittelalter

Abstract: Jean Gerson, chancellor of the university of Paris and influential theologian at the council of Constance, was known for his constant fight against curiosity. Instead of getting lost in futile speculation, theologians were admonished by him to take the utility of their research and teaching into account, a utility which, according to Gerson, manifested itself in its fruitful and edifying effect. He promoted this program or *stylus*, as he called it, as chancellor of the Parisian university in his many attempts to reform the curriculum, and he gave a practical demonstration of it to an international audience when opposing Jerome of Prague at Constance. But to what extent was this style received in the academic culture of the 15th century? This paper traces the impact of Gerson's *stylus* in a few *Sentences* commentaries, starting with contemporaries of Gerson such as Lambertus de Monte and Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl, and moving on to later examples at the turn of the 16th century and John Mair in particular. It becomes apparent that Gerson's *stylus* took some time to be received, but then ironically stimulated even more sophisticated approaches to theological problems.

Alessandra Saccon, *Die natürliche Gotteserkenntnis in den Schriften der Kölner Albertisten des 15. Jahrhunderts*

Abstract: The theory of an intuitive knowledge of God and the separate substances, without any conversion to material phantasms, is a doctrine of Albert the Great, which was received by the Cologne Albertists in the fifteenth century as a hallmark of their school in contrast to the Thomistic view. The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it aims to present the most popular Albertist texts of the second half of the fifteenth century, which deal with the explanation of the third book of Aristotle's *De anima*: a short commentary and three examples of *Reparationes*, a new literary genre. Secondly, the paper focuses on the way the Albertists read and interpreted Albert's theory of the intellect: despite the deference to their master, the Albertists changed some important aspects of his doctrine.

Mario Meliàdò, *De religiosa solitudine*. Eimerico di Campo e una controversia tardo-medievale sulla clausura

Abstract: The present article analyzes a fifteenth-century debate over the value and significance of enclosure in monastic contemplative life. The controversy arose as a consequence of the vow of seclusion taken by the canons regular in the convent of Bethlehem near Louvain and centered on the legitimacy of enclosure as an object of monastic *professio* as well as on its compatibility with Augustine's rule. The article surveys the sources of this debate clarifying its historical circumstances and its theoretical boundaries and focuses on the contribution of the Albertistic theologian Heymericus de Campo († 1460). The dossier of this *querelle* is mainly handed down in the manuscript Brussel, *Koninklijke Bibliotheek*, 11752-64, with the integration of the codex Wien, *Österreichische Nationalbibliothek*, Series Nova 12835 containing Heymericus' *Epistola de laude religiose solitudinis*.

Isabelle Mandrella, *Gaudium intellectuale*: Die intellektuelle Freude bei Nicolaus Cusanus

Abstract: As a neoplatonic philosopher for whom the intellect alone connects man with God, Nicholas of Cusa has without doubt a critical attitude towards the affective and emotional constitution of man. Accordingly, the deification of man is only imaginable as an interior quiet of all passions. But in analyzing his texts we can see that Nicholas, in order to describe the status of intellectual perfection, does not neglect affective and emotional categories and concepts. Not only the etymological deduction of *sapientia* as a tasting and delicious science (*sapida scientia*), but also his speaking of *gaudium intellectuale* und *dulcedo intellectualis* paints a different picture.

M^a Socorro Fernández-García, El deseo intelectual como constitutivo formal de la mente en Nicolás de Cusa

Abstract: The possibility of the knowledge of God is a significant question in the philosophy of Nicolás of Cusa. This leads to a particular natural theology with its corresponding method of knowledge, in which the intellectual desire is a constituent element which is knowledge in itself.

The desire is the natural way to tend towards the Absolute. Desiring means somehow knowing; above all, it means knowing what it is not known and for that same reason something which cannot stop being desired. Besides, the desire is possible because God is present in some way in the mind, which is what prompts the mind to desire. The desire is infinite because it cannot cease and because its object is also infinite.

God appears in our cognitive activity more as an archetypal presence than as an external object of knowledge. This presence is the cause of the intellectual activity and the condition of the possibility of the knowledge of the external objects.

Francesco Marrone, Le désir de connaître et la démonstration de la primauté de la philosophie première chez Dominique de Flandre

Abstract: The desire of knowledge constitutes, as it is well known, the opening 'theme' of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. This article focuses on the figure of Dominic of Flanders, one of the commentators of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* who much developed this topic. Dominicus deals with it in the second question of the first book of his commentary. What makes the interest of Dominic's account is its originality, in so far as, according to him, the beginning of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* aims to stress the very primacy of Metaphysics, and not only (as it was in Thomas Aquinas' commentary), the primacy of science in general. In this sense, the desire of knowledge constitutes for Dominic the most efficacious argument for the primacy of Metaphysics. However, this is possible only if the *desiderium sciendi* is related to two other principles: the first is that desirability entails perfection, and the second is that the desirability of an object depends on its intelligibility.

Christian Trottmann, Science, sagesse et jouissance, d'Augustin à Charles de Bovelles

Abstract: Can we find true bliss in any kind of knowledge or is it proper to wisdom only? In this essay I consider different medieval models of the relationship of knowledge to wisdom and pleasure, beginning with Augustine, then to monastic models, before turning to Scholastic models: the early Scholastic model of the relationship between knowledge is very different from the Aristotelian understanding of intellectual felicity developed by Scholastic philosophers and theologians in the thirteenth century. For Nicholas of Cusa (fifteenth century) intellectual pleasure is above any pleasure that can be attained by discursive reason; finally, I discuss Charles Bovelles' (sixteenth century) synthesis between the neo-Platonic model of the relationship between knowledge and wisdom, which he himself devised, and Augustine's understanding of the distinction between the two. Thus, after a long historical development we return to the beginning.

Maria da Conceição Camps, "The Pleasures of seeing" according to Manuel de Gois' *Coimbra Jesuit Commentary on De Anima* (1598)

Abstract: According to Manuel de Góis the sensitive knowledge is the only source of the intellectual knowledge, when the soul is united with the body. Among the external senses, vision plays the main role. Visual images are the principal source of the intellectual knowledge. The pleasure of knowing is sourced also in the pleasure of seeing that expresses the beauty, the harmony and the variety of nature and points to the intelligibility and goodness of the Creation.

Lidia Lanza, La *beatitudo* nei commenti cinquecentini di Salamanca alla *Summa theologiae* (I^a-II^{ae}, q. 3, artt. 1-2)

Abstract: In the *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas distinguishes between an extrinsic and an intrinsic beatitude, the first being caused by God and the latter by human acts. The sixteenth-century Salamanca commentators on the *Summa* concentrate their interpretative efforts on the intrinsic beatitude, assigning to the human acts an indispensable role in order to reach beatitude. Their main concern is to refute the Lutheran conception of man's passive role in his own justification.

Ángel Poncela-González, La teoría islámica del conocimiento profético y la concepción suareciana del intelecto

Abstract: We start from a line of research that studies the prophetic knowledge in Islamic philosophy of the classical period, as a symbol and a promise of perfect knowledge which can be reached by man. And from this place, we ask after the meaning of perfect knowledge in Suarez's epistemology. We will discuss a number of issues that will emerge from the analysis of the faculty of imagination inserted into an intentional conception of knowledge supported on two pillars: a theory of representation, explained by the mediation of intentional species and a theory of understanding, ending in judicative judgment as a path to truth. The depth and branching statements that present problems will cause us to focus on the last one.

Alfredo Culleton, La economía y el precio justo en la segunda escolástica

Abstract: In this article we present the intricate relationship between moral theology and economy developed in the Second Scholasticism and the issue of fair price, which is not new in the scholastic moral theology but in this case is treated in a philosophical way using an original perspective of practical rationality that earned many reissues.