

Michel Crubellier, *Domestiquer l'excès de l'être*

Abstract: In the Aristotelian corpus, the category *pros ti* (“relation”) is considered mainly in dialectical contexts, in which it is used as a device for finding convenient arguments for a given conclusion. Nevertheless, Aristotle shows some specific concern for the ontological status of relative terms. That occurs mainly in discussing Platonic issues, such as the nature of the first principles and the separation of the Forms. In fact, the standard definition of *pros ti* : “things that are what they are of something” (ὅσα αὐτὰ ἄπερ ἐστίν ἔτερων εἶναι λέγεται) was coined by Plato. Within an ontology that makes substance the paradigm of reality, there are two alternative strategies in order to deal with relative terms. Plato explored the possibility of making *otherness* a distinct and self-subsistent type of reality; Aristotle, on the contrary, reduces relative terms to properties, or even properties of properties, of his basic ontological objects, i.e. substances.

Key words: Aristotle; Categories; Ideas; Ontology; Plato; Relatives.

Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, *Relations et relatifs : les stoïciens contre Aristote*

Abstract: Aristotle's chap. 7 of the *Categories* include two successive definitions of relatives – according to the first, all that is said of something else is a relative, and, according to the second, a relative is something whose entire being consists in “a certain relation to something else”. The Stoics made use of these two definitions not only in the commentaries of Aristotle's *Categories* by Athenodorus and Cornutus (Ist century BC / Ist century AD), but also in debates inside the school on the unity of virtues and on causality. The Stoics drastically limited their relatives to the ones whose all being consists in a relation, which they call πρός τί πως ἔχοντα (“relatively disposed towards something”), and rejected the possibility that such relatives may be qualities or substances, while Aristotle left these two possibilities opened. The Stoics also seem to admit that some differentiated qualities may be relative to external objects, for instance sweet and bitter, but such relatives do not belong to the same category. Taking into account Aristotle's apories and choosing between alternatives left undecided by Aristotle, the Stoics proposed a powerful alternative to the aristotelian doctrine of relatives.

Key words: Relation; Relative; Category; Stoicism; Aristotle; Quality; Substance; Unity of Virtues; Causality.

Gweltaz Guyomarc'h, *Racine et rejetons*

Abstract: In Aristotle's *Metaphysics* IV.2, the possibility of the science of being *qua* being seems to depend on the famous so-called doctrine of ‘focal meaning’ (*pros hen*), i.e. the idea that all beings are said with reference to substance. This article focuses on Alexander of Aphrodisias' interpretation of this theory. I try here to determine whether Alexander tends to conceive being *qua* being as a genus and consequently underestimates the starting claim of IV.2: ‘being is said in many ways’. Does the fact that beings are ‘with reference to one’ (*pros hen*) imply they can be held as mere relatives (*pros ti*) and thus, according to Aristotle's own account of relatives, as ‘offshoots’ of substance? Alexander's interpretation appears to be worthy of interest in that it constantly tries to make consistent these two claims: being does not constitute a genus; the object studied by one science has to present a kind of unity.

Key words: Alexander of Aphrodisias; Aristotle; Focal Meaning; Substance; Categories; Relatives.

Jérôme Laurent, *L'équivocité de la relation selon Plotin*

Abstract: Translation with commentary of Plotinus' treatise *On kinds of being* (VI, 1, 6-9). On relation : difficulties of the Aristotelian doctrine ; relations are not only in our thinking.

Key words: Plotinus, relation, Aristotelian categories, homonym.

Anca Vasiliu, *Relation absolue et relation relative*

Abstract: In which manner do two of the most speculative theologians of the first Nicaean tradition, a Greek and a Latin, almost contemporary, use the Aristotelian category of “relation” in respect of both the Neoplatonic definition of the monadic God and the necessity to conceive, inside the divine identity, relations corresponding to the generation of the Logos-Son and to the act of presence proper to the Holy-Spirit? Around 360, Marius Victorinus says that “the Father is existence which has actual value, i.e. substantiality (*actualis existentia, id est substantialitas*), while the Son is act with existential value (*actus existentialis*)”. Around 375, Basilus of Caesarea says that only equal honour (*homotimon*) attached to the three Persons of the Trinity can demonstrate the validity of the Nicaean proclamation defining the essential unity and existential distinction of divine identities. Based on “identity”, “equality” and “similitude”, the concept of equal honour (*homotimon*) is considered as the condition for the possibility of conceiving the unique God in three *hypostaseis*; it also shows the possibility to conceive divine image and divine knowledge.

Both kinds of relation – absolute relation inside identity and relations between correlative items – used by Basilus and Victorinus to design the Trinitarian structure are based on the Aristotelian use of “similitude” and “equality” in the *Categories* and in *Metaphysic Delta*. Equality, called “pure relation”, expresses unity and is particularly important in the conception of the intra-trinitarian relations topical (by means of the particles) to both definitions of the Trinity. Although their definitions are not similar, Basilus and Victorinus use the same philosophical instruments. Two kinds of theological arguments derive from the category of “relation”: (1) one, together with the heritage of Plato and Plotinus, develops reflexivity and argues

for divine image; (2) the other is basically indebted to the ontological categories of Aristotle and uses their philosophical virtues to demonstrate that act and potentiality can reflect reciprocal relation and that relatives and correlatives can reflect simultaneous being inside One.

Key words: *Ousia; Hypostasis; Homoousios; Homotimos; Skesis; Pros ti; Eikôn; En-eikonizô; Actus; Substantia; Existentia; Ad aliquid; Imago.*

Christophe Erismann, *Olympiodorus on the Reality of Relations and the Order of the World*

Abstract: This article examines the position of the sixth century Alexandrian Neoplatonist scholar Olympiodorus on the existence of relations. A part of his commentary on chapter VII of the *Categories* dedicated to relatives (*pros ti*) contains valuable arguments about the reality of relations. Relations are necessary to guarantee the order of the world, the fitting arrangement of the body, and providence. In the last section, Olympiodorus's claim about the order of the world is discussed against the background of the so-called "Porphyry's Tree". The theoretical consequences of the relational dimension of this Porphyrian pattern are addressed

Key words: Olympiodorus; Aristotle; Categories; Relations; *Pros ti*; Demiurge; Providence; Porphyry; Order of the World; John Damascene.

Kristell Trego, *Inhérence ou relation ?*

Abstract: This article examines the doctrine of the categories in Boethius' theological tractates. While, in his commentaries on Aristotle's works, Boethius claims that accidents are in the substance-subject, in the opuscula sacra he emphasizes on the concept of relation.

Key words: Boethius; Substance; Inherence; Relation; Circumstances.

Abdelmajid Baakrime, *La relation perceptive selon Alhazen et ses retombées philosophiques*

Abstract : The present paper is concerned with Alhazen's theory of vision and the new relationship that it developed between the two poles of the perceptual process. As he was actually understood by the oriental and occidental philosophers of the Medieval times, Alhazen broke sharply with the Aristotelian model. Eventually, Alhazen's theory had an impact not only on the optics , which acquired a new impetus, but more importantly on philosophy, especially on the theory of knowledge, since a considerable part of the prerogatives of the sense faculty – common *sensibles* – would become, from there, those of the intellect. This gave rise to eminent controversies in what regards pairs, like sensible-intelligible and necessary-contingent, as well as it fed debate between Augustinian and Aristotelian scholars. That altogether reveals the conceptual feature and, subsequently, the revolutionary orientation of Alhazen's theory of vision.

Key words: Vision; Perception; Intellect; Sense; Intuition; Primary Principles; Time; Revolution

Olga Lizzini, *Causality as Relation: Avicenna (and al-Ġazālī)*

Abstract: *All existent beings are in relation to one another:* with this statement Avicenna seems to affirm the idea of an ontological context. But in what sense should we conceive this ontological context and in what sense could we apply it to the God-world relationship? In the attempt to answer both questions a brief analysis of Avicenna's conception of relation and of causality as relation is offered.

Key words: Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā); Causality; Relation; God-world relationship; Emanation.

Pasquale Porro, *Déduction catégoriale et prédictaments relatifs à la fin du XIII^e siècle : le De origine rerum praedicamentalium de Dietrich de Freiberg et son contexte*

Abstract: The article aims at placing Dietrich of Freiberg's *De origine rerum praedicamentalium* in its context, i.e. that of the discussions on the 'deduction' of categories and the ontological status of relative predicaments at the end of the 13th century, especially with respect to Henry of Ghent's position. When Dietrich affirms that some things of first intention are constituted by the intellect, he refers only to the relative categories; as for the natural 'absolute' things (*res naturae*), Dietrich maintains on the contrary that the intellect produces only their quidditative being (i.e. the being they have insofar as they possess a definition). Dietrich's *De origine* should therefore be likened more to a new, anti-realistic version of the *Liber sex principiorum* than to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.

Key words: Dietrich of Freiberg; Henry of Ghent; *De origine rerum praedicamentalium*; Relations; Categories; *Liber sex principiorum*

Mark Henninger, *John Duns Scotus and Peter Auriol on the Ontological Status of Relations*

Abstract: In this article, the problem of the ontological status of real relations is first examined as it was generally formulated by the scholastics of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, that is, within a solid and defining Aristotelian substance/attribute framework. I then examine John Duns Scotus's strong realism on relations, giving his key arguments for his teaching, as also his arguments against the rival non-realist, conceptualist view. This latter view was championed most strongly

and extensively by Peter Auriol, and I examine both his arguments for his novel conceptualist theory of relations, along with his counter-arguments to Scotus's criticisms. I conclude by showing how some early fourteenth-century thinkers were beginning to reject key traditional assumptions of the scholastic debate.

Key words: John Duns Scotus; Peter Auriol; Relations; Conceptualism; Causality; Order of the Universe; Numbers.

Alessandro D. Conti, *Realism vs Nominalism: The Controversy between Burley and Ockham over the Nature and Ontological Status of the ad aliquid*

Abstract: The article focuses on one important aspect of this debate between Realists and Nominalists in the Late Middle Ages, namely the controversy between William Ockham and Walter Burley about the nature and status of relations and relatives, for the category of *ad aliquid* is the most intriguing category after substance, and in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages many authors attempted to develop new formulations of the Aristotelian theory of relatives. Burley believed that when two substances are related one to the other, five distinct elements can be singled out: the relation itself (for instance, the form of paternity); the ultimate substrate of that relation (namely, the substance that denominatively receives the name of the relation – the animal which is called ‘father’ because it begot another similar to itself); the *fundamentum* of the relation (namely the categorial item in virtue of which the relation inheres in its substrate – in our example, the generative power); the antecedent term of the relation (namely the aggregate formed by the substrate in which the relation inheres and the relation itself – in our example, the father); and the consequent term of the relation (namely, the aggregate formed by the substance with which the *subiectum* is somehow connected and the relation correlated to the first one – in our example, the son). In fact, according to Burley, any relation has its own converse. The foundation is the main component, since it joins the relation to the underlying substances, permits the relation to link the antecedent term to the consequent term, and transmits some of its properties to the relation. Ockham, on the contrary, believed that terms such as ‘*relativum*’, ‘*relatio*’, and ‘*ad aliquid*’ are terms of second intention, since they signify other (vocal, written, mental) terms, when taken in personal supposition. In Ockham’s opinion, Socrates qua father cannot be regarded as a relative; it is the name ‘father’ (and the corresponding *intentio*) that is a relative. This implies that the abstract terms of the category, namely those terms that in Burley’s view signify relations such as ‘*paternitas*’, and the concrete terms, namely those terms that in Burley’s view signify relatives such as ‘*pater*’, are synonymous according to Ockham. He thinks that any abstract term belonging to the category of *ad aliquid* is semantically equivalent to the definition (in a broad sense) of the correlated concrete term, so that, for instance, ‘paternity’ in a sentence like ‘a father is a father because of paternity’ means: a father is a father because he has begotten a son. Such differences between them in their divergent interpretations of Aristotle’s theory of *ad aliquid* consist in the opposing roles that reality plays in their explanations of human knowledge, and Ockham’s rejection, in favour of a principle of ontological parsimony, of the principle of a close isomorphism between (mental) language and the world. For Burley, extra-mental reality was the model that our knowledge has to adequate and reproduce, whilst Ockham conceived of reality as a simple object of our knowledge, which does concern reality, but is articulated according to inner principles. Burley’s thought was dominated by the object-label scheme, as the basic semantic relation, and by hypostatization, regarded as the practice of replacing logical and epistemological rules by ontological standards and references, as the main device for explaining the semantic function of language. On the contrary, for Ockham reality must consist of as few as possible kinds of being.

Key words: Medieval Nominalism; Medieval Realism; Relations; Categories.

Massimiliano Savini, *Respectus et relatio : la relation chez Descartes*

Abstract: The point of departure of this article is a lexical analysis, extended to the entire Cartesian corpus, focusing on the lemmas *respectus* and *relatio* and their adjectival forms. Starting from here, the article addresses Descartes’ doctrine of the relation, in so far as it is developed in the *Regulae ad directionem ingenii*. In this writing, two notions of ‘relation’ emerge: on the one side, the notion of *respectus*, that Descartes employs in the epistemological reflection of the first twelve rules; on the other side, the notion of *relatio*, which is the object, especially of the last four rules. The analysis developed in the article shows that the two notions are distinct and different. The first (*respectus*), whose nature is mainly noetic, is related to the Cartesian topic of the *ordo*, which constitutes the sequential disposition of knowledge in connection with the unity of the *mens*; the second (*relatio*), on the contrary, has a more technical meaning, and concerns the function of the numerical unity, which is the term of reference in the construction of mathematical proportions.

Key words: *Respectus*; *Relatio*; Relation; Descartes; *Regulae ad directionem ingenii*; Order; Proportion; Comparison.

Robert Theis, *Relatio in Christian Wolffs Ontologie*

Abstract: Wolffs’ peculiar treatment of the notion of ‘*relatio*’ is situated in the Latin *Ontologia* within the section on the *dependentia rerum*, of which it is seen as a modal form. Yet, whereas *dependentia* reveals an asymmetrical structure, *relatio* is thought as fundamentally symmetrical (*dependentia unius ad alterum*). Moreover, Wolff defends a realistic ontology of relation instead of a merely semantic one: relations belong to things, although not in an absolute manner, but rather in the sense that relations have in them a *foundation* in terms of a *disposition*.

A further question concerns in general the status of Wolff’s ontology as mostly a relational ontology. It is demonstrated that the properties of being reveal a kind of ontological surplus which turns out to be a relational one.

In the conclusions the problem of the notion of ‘relation’ is further discussed from the point of view of natural theology: it is here demonstrated that the relationship between God and creature can be considered, on the one hand, in terms of *dependencia realis*, on the other, in terms of *dependencia ficta* (when seen from the point of view of God).

Key words: Christian Wolff; Relation; *Dependentia*; *Affectiones entis*; God / Creature.

Véronique Decaix, *Théologie rationnelle ou métaphysique ?
Les deux sens de la métaphysique chez Dietrich de Freiberg*

Abstract: This article considers the definition of metaphysics of Dietrich of Freiberg (1250-1320) and challenges Albert Zimmermann’s reading of his metaphysics as rational theology. The aim is to prove that metaphysics is not identical to rational theology. First, we inquire into the subject and the proper definition of theology (science of God), distinguished from rational theology (science of being in relation to God). Second, we distinguish rational theology from metaphysics in the proper sense, which is defined by Dietrich as the study of being *qua* being. Within this framework, metaphysics is the science of being and its consequent properties, organized according to *per se* modes of predication, and it deals with the formal components of substance. Such a characterisation of metaphysics as different from rational theology offers a new perspective on Dietrich of Freiberg’s sources and influences by revealing a closer proximity to authors such as Avicenna and Aquinas, rather than to Averroes or to neoplatonic thinkers like Master Eckhart (as most scholars assume).

Key words: Dietrich of Freiberg; Metaphysics; Theology; Rational Theology; Analogy; Thomas Aquinas; Avicenna; Being; Division of Sciences.

Marienza Benedetto, *Storie di ricezione: Tolomeo, Avicenna e Averroè
nel Medioevo arabo, ebraico e latino*

Abstract: The recent (re-)publication of volumes about Avicenna allows us to revisit his central position in the history of philosophy and his overwhelming influence in Arabic, Jewish and Latin cultures: even those who disagreed with Avicenna often developed their standpoint in confrontation with him. Equally significant and deep was Averroes’ impact on the philosophical tradition: the *Quaestio de anima intellectiva* by Thomas Wylton is a good example in this sense, presenting one the most original reading of Averroes’ noetic in the 14th century.

Key words: Avicenna; Averroes; Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception; Noetic.

Friederike Schmiga, *Die Studienhäuser und der Hof als Kontext der Wissensvermittlung.
Zu einer neueren Publikation*

Abstract: Reflecting upon a recently published collection of essays dealing with the study of philosophy and theology at the religious study-houses (*studia*) and at the papal and royal court in the 13th and 14th century, the review-article presents an overview of the various approaches to researching the relevance of the institutional context for understanding the forms and doctrinal contents of the period’s intellectual production. On the basis of the volume under discussion, five basic approaches are identified and discussed: first, a focus on the institutional framework of education at the religious orders’ *studia*; second, a (re)reading of important works in the context of the *studia*’s teaching practices; third, the regional particularity of certain study-houses; fourth, the formative role of individual personalities for the order’s intellectual profile; and fifth, the papal and royal court as specific setting of some influential philosophical and theological debates.

Key words: Contexts of knowledge; Study-houses (*studia*); Institutional aspects of medieval philosophy and theology.

Anna Arezzo, *Potere e limiti della conoscenza da Enrico di Gand a Enrico di Harclay*

Abstract: Henry of Ghent can be considered the secular master of the thirteenth century who describes with a more emphasis and originality the relation between knowledge and power. Henry asserts (art. XIII, q. 3 of the *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*; *Quodlibet XII*, q. 2) that even if Faith, as an instilled habit in us, is prior to any other form of knowledge, in order to grasp the truth of the Holy Scriptures, we need the *lumen naturale*. Nevertheless, in order to attain a better understanding of the terms of the theological propositions, a *clarius lumen*, is wanted: it is the special illumination granted to the theologians which allows them to grasp – already in this life! – those truths that ordinary man cannot grasp by means of the *lumen naturale*, or simply by means of the *lumen fidei*. Introducing a *lumen speciale*, intermediate between the *lumen fidei*, granted to every pious man, and the *lumen gloriae*, proper to the *beati*, Henry renders the theologian a special man. John Duns Scotus, Peter Auriol and Henry of Harclay, re-phrasing Henry’s doctrine, admit only the possibility that someone in this life scientifically knows the divine truths. On the other hand Henry of Ghent affirms that, at least only the theologian, really knows these truths. From this knowledge *speciale* derives as much power *speciale* related to *vita activa*.

In accord with Henry, therefore, the theologian is the true scientist and legislator, even superior than the pope and so, maybe, he could be considered the happiest human being *in via*.

Key words: Knowledge; Power; Henry of Ghent; *Lumen*; Theologian; John Duns Scotus; Peter Auriol; Henry of Harclay.